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ABSTRACT
Payment channel networks provide a fast and scalable solution
to relay funds, acting as a second layer to slower and less scal-
able blockchain protocols. In this paper, we present an accessible,
low-cost attack in which the attacker paralyzes multiple payment
network channels for several days. The attack is based on over-
loading channels with requests that are kept unresolved until their
expiration time. Reaching the maximum allowed unresolved re-
quests (HTLCs) locks the channel for new payments. The attack
is in fact inherent to the way off-chain networks are constructed,
since limits on the number of unresolved payments are derived
from limits on the blockchain. We consider three main versions of
the attack: one in which the attacker attempts to block as many
high liquidity channels as possible, one in which it disconnects as
many pairs of nodes as it can, and one in which it tries to isolate
individual nodes from the network. We evaluate the costs of these
attacks on Bitcoin’s Lightning Network and compare how changes
in the network have affected the cost of attack. Specifically, we
consider how recent changes to default parameters in each of the
main Lightning implementations contribute to the attacks. As we
evaluate the attacks, we also look at statistics on parameters in the
Lightning Network, which are of independent interest and com-
pare the various implementations of Lightning nodes. Finally, we
suggest mitigation techniques that make these attacks much harder
to carry out.
1 INTRODUCTION
Payment channel networks such as The Lightning Network [28]
and Raiden [25] are a second layer off-chain solution to the scalabil-
ity problems of blockchains. Such payment channel networks that
run on top of Bitcoin [23] and Ethereum [3] allow both a higher
number of transactions and faster transaction resolution. These
properties, that are in stark contrast to the blockchain’s slow trans-
action throughput and slow confirmation times make payment
channel networks one of the leading approaches to increase the
adoption of cryptocurrencies and may even allow low-fee micro-
payments in these systems.
Payment channel networks require participants to lock funds
into channels, which then allows them to perform payments using
these locked funds. Payments can be relayed over several hops,
travelling over multiple channels to their destination.
In this paper we evaluate an attack that locks funds in channels
between honest participants that are potentially far away from
the attacker, giving the attacker the ability to disrupt the transfer
of payments throughout the network. The costs of running the
attack are extremely low. In contrast to previously known attacks
that locked liquidity in channels [31], the method we present here
requires far lower costs as it does not require the attacker to lock
a substantial amount of liquidity. We evaluate these costs in the
Lightning Network, where we show that using less than half a
bitcoin, the attacker can indefinitely lock up channels holding the
majority of the funds currently assigned to the network.
Our attack is based on the inner workings of themainmechanism
that makes payment channel networks possible: Hashed Time-
Locked Contracts (HTLC). Essentially, as payments are set up to
move along some path in the network, all channels along the path
reserve some funds for the transfer that is about to take place. The
number of simultaneously reserved and unresolved payments per
path is limited. Our attack thus simply opens many small payment
requests along extremely long paths and keeps them unresolved
for as long as possible. In this way, all channels along the path are
unable to relay other transfers.
The vulnerability can be attributed to three fundamental proper-
ties of off-chain payment networks.
1. Payments are executed in a trustless manner. Payments are
executed using conditional payment contracts (in the form of trans-
actions with HTLCs) that are exchanged between parties and are
only sent to the blockchain if disputes arise. These contracts grow
in size as more conditional payments are pending, and so the to-
tal number of pending payments is limited by transactions sizes
that can be placed on the blockchain. Bitcoin’s Lightning Network
is limited to at most 483 concurrent HTLCs [34], while Raiden is
limited (due to gas costs) to at most 160 [24].
2. Expiration times are long. To allow nodes to recover their
funds if a malicious partner closes a channel that is part of a pend-
ing payment, HTLC expiration times have been set to allow nodes
sufficient time to appeal such closures.
In Bitcoin’s Lightning Network things are even more severe: due
to lower expressiveness of its scripting language, HTLC expiration
times accumulate over the length of the path, reaching up to 2016
blocks – which typically take the Bitcoin network two weeks to
produce.
3. The privacy of payments. Payment Channel Networks utilize
onion routing that does not allow intermediate nodes on the path
to recognize where payments originate and where they are going,
allowing the attacker to act with impunity. Payment privacy essen-
tially prevents us from attributing blame to potential attackers and
add mechanisms that effectively detect the attack.
The vulnerability. In order to paralyze channels, the attacker
first adds a new node to the payment network. It then identifies a
route suitable to attack, considering some restrictions on the path
(maximum route length, locktime of intermediate nodes, remaining
HTLC capacity) and maximizing the attack benefit (to lock channels
with a large amount of funds or high betweenness value). It opens
channels with the source and target of the route, and requests
many small payments through this path, exhausting the number of
simultaneously open HTLCs (see Figure 1). Since the attacker is both
the source and destination of this payment, it can choose to delay
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the final execution of the payment which would remove all pending
HTLCs from the path. The path is then locked for long periods of
time (up to several days). Just before expiration, the attacker sends
an update_failure message to the previous node, which cancels the
payment and reverts the state, avoiding a forced closure of the
attacker’s channel. This allows the attacker to re-run the attack
once again and lock the same path for an additional period of time.
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Figure 1: The adversary identifies routes suitable to attack
In this paper we evaluate the attack specifically on the Lightning
Network, which is the most prominently used payment channel
network.We evaluate threemain attack scenarios: First, we consider
an attack on the entire network, which attempts to lock as many
channels as possible and focuses on channels holding most of the
funds in the network. This sort of disruption would severely hinder
the volume of payments that can be sent on the Lightning Network.
The main complexity in carrying out this attack is picking routes in
a way that respects limits on the maximal delay incurred along the
path, and still targets the channels with the highest connectivity
and liquidity.
The second attack scenario we consider is one that disconnects
as many pairs of nodes as possible and breaks the network into sepa-
rate components. For this, we utilize measures of edge betweenness
to pick which channels to attack.
Finally, the third attack variant that we evaluate targets single
nodes and paralyzes all channels that connect them to the network.
As far as we are aware, while exhaustion of the HTLCs of a chan-
nel is known to paralyze the channel, the attack that we describe
has never been evaluated for its effects on the network, or on indi-
vidual nodes. In particular, there are no available estimates of the
cost to attackers from executing either version of the attacks we
propose.1
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
gives more background related to the Lightning Network. Section 3
explores the current networkâĂŹs basic characteristics and statis-
tics, specifically focusing on parameters relevant for the attack. In
1We were able to find public record describing the basic idea of the attack, which
was raised as a git issue in the BOLT [7] and mentioned in some correspondence in
the Lightning-dev list [32]. We note that no full evaluation of the consequences of
the attack was done. Due to the public nature of these posts, we did not perform a
disclosure of the vulnerability to the devs.
Sections 4- 5 we present the attacks and evaluate their effectiveness
and costs. Section 6 presents our proof of concept experiments –
paralyzing channels we construct in test-networks in order to vali-
date the attack. In Section 7 we explore suggestions and mitigation
techniques to reduce the vulnerability of the network. Section 8
discusses related work. We conclude in Section 9.
2 BACKGROUND ON THE LIGHTNING
NETWORK
We introduce some of the basic properties of the Lightning Network.
The Lightning Network is made up of a collection of channels, each
established between a pair of nodes. Channels are provided with
funds (either by both nodes or by one) that are locked into a Bitcoin
output that is redeemable only by both participants. Channels can
then be used to transfer funds between the two participants. This is
done by exchanging signed transaction messages between them, re-
allocating the funds in the channel. As of mid-2020, the Lightning
Network has more than 13k nodes and 36k channels and holds a
total capacity of around 940 BTC.
The Lightning Network then allows payments to occur over
longer paths, essentially shifting payments from the originating
node to its successor in the path, and from that successor onward.
The network utilizes source-routing, and its topology is gossiped
between nodes in the network to allow payments to be sent. We use
this information on the topology to evaluate the different attacks.
Hashed Time Locked Contracts (HTLCs). The main obstacle that
the protocol overcomes in order to allow for longer paths is ensuring
that payments are done in a trustless manner – nodes that follow
the protocol cannot lose their funds even if others on the path
misbehave. The way this is achieved is using conditional payments
called “Hashed Time-Locked Contracts” (HTLCs).
HTLCs promise an intermediate node on the channel that it can
receive funds if it submits a cryptographic proof (pre-image of
a hash) within a given timeframe (specified as a specific chain
height). Each transaction that occurs in the Lightning Network is
first set up by adding an additional HTLC output to every channel
on its path. Once these are set up, the payment is executed by
propagating the pre-image from the payment’s recipient back along
the path towards the sender. Once the pre-image arrives at some
intermediate node, it can essentially guarantee that it can receive
the funds (if it posts the transaction with the pre-image to the
blockchain). The conditional payment is then removed from the
channel and is replaced by a non-conditional reallocation of the
funds.
The main problem with the approach above is that if several
payments are being set up, the number of HTLCs on a channel
grows. This implies that the transaction that will eventually be
posted to the blockchain will be large – setting a natural limit on
the number of HTLCs that can be simultaneously open on a channel.
HTLC Timeouts. Usually, channels are set up quickly and do not
wait long for the pre-image to propagate. An update_failuremessage
may sometime be returned instead of the pre-image if one of the
intermediate nodes cannot or will not relay the payment. However,
malicious nodes may withhold the pre-image and not propagate it
back (or alternatively not complete the channel set up with HTLCs).
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In such cases, HTLCs are designed to expire. This is done using a
CheckLockTimeVerify (CLTV) instruction, which essentially does
not allow the HTLC to be redeemed after a certain block height. In
order to ensure that intermediate nodes do not lose funds, outgoing
HTLCs must expire before incoming HTLCs do. Each node specifies
a parameter cltv_expiry_delta, which specifies the difference
in timeouts it is willing to tolerate. The timeout of payments is
therefore the accumulation of the cltv_expiry_deltas from the
end of the route towards its beginning (the last node’s timeout is
limited by a parameter named min_final_cltv_expiry instead
of cltv_expiry_delta). As cltv_expiry_deltas are typically ei-
ther 40 blocks or 144 blocks, the timeouts of HTLCs can accumulate
and often take days. Nodes impose a limit on the maximal timeout
locktime_max, which is set to 2016 blocks (equivalent to 2 weeks).
This high timeout makes the attack extremely potent.
Figure 2 depicts the process of route establishment and the elim-
ination of HTLCs. It displays constraints on the timeouts of HTLCs
(denoted ti ) and considers two payment scenarios: One in which the
pre-image is successfully propagated back to the sender, and one
in which the last node does not send the secret. In the second case,
once the timeout expires, the preceding node closes the channel
and sends an update_failure message back to cancel the HTLC.
Privacy. To preserve privacy, payment routes are constructed by
the senders which employ onion routing to reveal to each node only
the identity of their immediate predecessor and successor on the
route. Since the network topology and cltv_expiry_deltas are
known publicly, as well as the fees, the sender can choose a route
and construct the HTLCswith timeouts that abide by the restrictions
of all nodes on the path. Setting the route timeout to be the sum-
mation of the cltv_expiry_deltas along it allows intermediate
nodes to obtain information about the route (knowing the topology
and cltv_expiry_deltas of others often allows them to recon-
struct the path). Therefore, the sender is allowed to add an offset to
the delaywhich is usually constructed by picking a random "shadow
route" and mimicking it. Since the maximum route length is limited
to 20 hops [34] and locktime_max is limited to 2016, we can exploit
these high values in order to set a payment path with high added
timeout delay that will allow the attacker to withhold the last HTLC
for a very long time. More explicitly, we will set the total cltv_expiry
for the whole payment route to be exactly the locktime_max, and
for each hop reduce the exact cltv_expiry_delta required and
restrict the path length accordingly.
Fees. Additional information that is propagated to all nodes
about all channels relates to the fees that nodes charge for us-
ing the channel. Nodes limit the payments they are willing to
transfer to a minimum value (in millisatoshi) that is denoted as
htlc_minimum_msat. The fees themselves are given using two
parameters: a base fee which is a constant amount charged
per HTLC and denoted fee_base_msat, and proportional fee
which increases with the amount being relayed and is denoted
fee_proportional_millionths.
3 LIGHTNING NETWORK ANALYSIS
We begin our exploration of the current state of the Lightning
Network by listing the default values for various parameters in
the main implementations of the Lightning protocol. These are of
interest since, as we show later below, most nodes use the defaults,
and thus these heavily influence the state of the Lightning Network
and its vulnerability to our attack.
3.1 Default Parameter Values
The BOLT (Basis of Lightning Technology) [34] specifications detail
the protocol of Lightning Networks. These were originally drafted
in late 2016 to allow several implementations to work together. In
our work, we focus on the main three implementations: LND [16],
C-Lightning [4], and Eclair [6]
Each of the implementations uses slightly different default values
for parameters of interest. These are depicted in Table 1, along with
ranges or values specified in the BOLT.2
LND C-Lightning Eclair BOLT
cltv_expiry_delta 40 14 144 -
min_final_cltv_expiry 40 10 9 9
locktime_max 2016 2016 2016 <5 · 108
htlc_minimum_msat 1000 1000 1 -
max_concurrent_htlcs 483 30 30 ≤ 483
fee_base_msat 1000 1000 1000 -
fee_proportional_millionths 1 10 100 -
Table 1: Default Parameters
Recent changes to the defaults have in fact made our attack easier
to carry out: LND changed their cltv_expiry_delta default from
144 to 40 blocks (on Mar 12th, 2019) [29], which allows chaining
more nodes in each path without reaching the locktime_max limit.
Nodes running an old version may still hold the 144 default that
was used prior to that.
Additionally, a locktime_max of 2016 was agreed upon by Light-
ning developers, in the 2018 Adelaide meeting to set the BOLT
1.1 specs [5]. This is an increase of previous values used in some
implementations. Again, this allows for longer routes and longer
expiration delays that make the attack more damaging and easier
to carry out.
3.2 Network Statistics
We introduce some statistics on the parameters announced by nodes
in channels on the Lightning Network.3 In order to perform the
calculations, we took snapshots of the Lightning Network mainnet.
The information was obtained using the describegraph command
of LND. Our results correspond to a network snapshot taken on
May 21st, 2020. We include other analysis with snapshots taken at
different times for comparison.
In Figure 3, we present the most common values of four of the
parameters announced by nodes. It is clear that very few values are
used. The remaining values appeared less than 3% each (which we
grouped together as “other”).
Figure 3A presents the distribution of htlc_minimum_msat, the
minimum amount inmillisatoshi (msat) that the node will be willing
to transfer. The results indicate that 99.8% configure values ≤ 1000
msat, which is less than 0.0001 USD.While this allows nodes to relay
2We give the defaults used in mainnet. Testnet behavior differs slightly.
3We ignore disabled channels and channels with nodes that do not reveal their policies.
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Figure 2: Multi-hop Payment in the Lightning Network
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Figure 3: Statistics on parameters announced by nodes in
channels on the Lightning Network
micropayments of this size, it will also allow us to send extremely
small payments and will make the attack cheaper to carry out.
In Figure 3B, we obtain the distribution of fee_base_msat, the
constant fee (in msat) the node will charge per transfer. The results
indicate that 96.4% of the network define fee_base_msat ≤ 1000
msat.
Figure 3C displays the distribution of fee_proportional_mi-
llionths. This is the amount (in millionths of a satoshi) that nodes
will charge per transferred satoshi. 95.5% of the network configure
it to be ≤ 0.001 msat, and 62.4% set it to be ≤ 0.000001 msat.
The previous statistics imply that the attack’s cost is extremely
low. We note that we often utilize routes with many hops in the
attack. In such routes, fees tend to build up along the route, as fees
that are transferred to far-away nodes also increase proportional
fees themselves on nearby channels. Transfers and fees thus in-
crease exponentially with the length of the path—but with a very
low rate of growth. We elaborate more on costs in Section 4.
Finally, we examine the distribution of cltv_expiry_delta.
This is the minimum difference in HTLC timeouts the forwarding
node will accept. We recall from table 1 that 144, 40, and 14 are
the defaults that correspond to the different implementations men-
tioned previously. In Figure 3D, we see that the defaults constitute
74% of the total.
We note that when traversing a channel in two different di-
rections, the values of cltv_expiry_delta that are used may be
different, as these correspond to the values set by nodes. We add an
analysis of the cltv_expiry_delta distribution by nodes (rather
than by channel), which we do by looking at the most common
value of cltv_expiry_delta used by each node. In this case, we
see that 70.8% of the nodes use the value 40, 17.5% use 144, and 7.1%
use the value 14. The remaining values (such as 30, 9, 4) are each
associated with less than 1.4% of the nodes.
The value 30, which is common when looking at the distribu-
tion of channels, is not often used by nodes. In fact, this value
is used primarily by a single entity that controls some 25 nodes:
LNBIG [15]. These nodes are extremely central to the network,
holding approximately half of the network’s capacity in multiple
channels.
How do values change over time? In our attack, the route
length we can compose is often limited by the values of
cltv_expiry_delta. We are therefore also interested in how
these values change over time. Figure 4 shows the changes in
4
cltv_expiry_delta during a 14 month period. We show only the
most common values.4
Figure 4: cltv_expiry_deltas in different snapshots
The main change that can be observed is the decreased use in the
value 144 and the increase in the use of the value 40. We attribute
this to the fact that LND changed their default cltv_expiry_delta
from 144 to 40 in Mar 2019 [29]. As LND nodes update to the latest
version, and as old channels are closed and new ones are opened, the
statistics gradually change. We can also deduce from the magnitude
of the change that LND constitutes a considerable percentage of
the network. We will examine this further below.
3.3 Tagging Nodes by Implementation
Our attack is based on overloading channels to their max-
imum HTLC capacity, which is determined by the minimum
max_concurrent_htlcs of the peers in the channel. The
max_concurrent_htlcs is a configured parameter set by the node’s
owner. Default values differ between implementations as described
in Table 2.
implementation max_concurrent_htlcs
LND 483
C-Lightning 30
Eclair 30
Table 2: Default max_concurrent_htlcs in the mainnet con-
figuration for different implementations
The information of which client a node runs and what value of
max_concurrent_htlcs it uses is not accessible publicly. Hence,
we use the data nodes do publish via channel_update messages
in order to infer which implementation they run and deduce the
max_concurrent_htlcs defaults. Here, we rely strongly on the
assumption that most users do not change default values too much.
This assumption is supported by the statistics we show in Sec-
tion 3.2.
We perform classification using defaults from table 1 in order
to infer the implementation of each node. Where nodes deviated
from defaults, we use a score that is weighted according to the
4The snapshot from Mar 9th, 2019 was taken from an external source [30, 31]
parameter that was changed in order to infer themost likely original
implementation. The weights we have used are:
• cltv_expiry_delta : 0.75
• htlc_minimum_msat : 0.2
• fee_proportional_millionths : 0.05
For each node in the network, we check the compatibility of these
parameters in the policies of its channels with the implementation
defaults (using the weights) and decide the label. 5
Figure 5: Deduced Implementation Distribution
The results of the implementation inference at different times are
presented in Figure 5. We see that our analysis resulted in tagging
approximately 90% of the nodes as LND. When we then reduce the
network graph to nodes labeled LND alone, we find that we remain
with 89% of the network’s original capacity (in BTC). Hence, LND
nodes are both the most common nodes, and also the ones that hold
most of the liquidity in the network.
For our purposes, this implies that channels between LND nodes
are most likely to have max_concurrent_htlcs set to 483. A small
minority of channels involves either an Eclair node or a C-Lightning
node, which would imply that their max_concurrent_htlcs is set
to 30 (at least in one direction).
In the next two sections, we explain three different modes of
attack that we evaluated. In the first attack, we attempt to lock up
channels with as much liquidity as possible throughout the network.
Our assumption is that by tying up a large fraction of the liquidity
of the network, we will severely restrict its operations. We evaluate
the costs of such attacks and their efficiency. In the second scenario
we disconnect as many pairs of nodes as possible, showing how
this attack affects connectivity between nodes in the network. In
our third attack, we target a specific node and attempt to lock all
of its channels, effectively isolating it from the payment network.
Here the degree of a node will be key to the cost of attack.
4 ATTACKING THE ENTIRE NETWORK
In this section, we consider a malicious node that wishes to disrupt
the entire network’s operation. Our attacker uses a greedy algo-
rithm in order to pick routes and paralyze as much liquidity or to
disconnect as many pairs of nodes as possible. For each route, the
5The results were robust to the use of different classification methods that we tried.
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attacker will initiate max_concurrent_htlcs payments, and with-
hold the response, turning all channels along the path unavailable
for new requests. Just before expiration, the attacker will announce
a failure to complete the payment. This step is repeated for multiple
disjoint routes making the network less and less connected.
The main challenge faced by the attacker is to use routes com-
posed of channels with similar max_concurrent_htlcs so that we
do not leave parts of the path unlocked, and to fit as many high-
liquidity channels within the limits of 20 hops and locktime_max
total delay. Hence, we divide the network to subgraphs with simi-
lar max_concurrent_htlcs, and use a greedy algorithm to select
routes. The greedy algorithm that we utilized is presented as Al-
gorithm 1. It is parametrized by G (a subgraph of the network)
and a parameter τmin that denotes the minimal time (measured in
blocks) that we would like paths to be locked for. The algorithm
utilizes a “weight” function that is used to select the channels that
are attacked. In some of our experiments we set this to be channel
capacities (seeking to freeze as much liquidity as possible) and in
some we set the weight function to be the betweenness centrality
of the edges (seeking to disconnect as many pairs of nodes as we
can). In the latter, we take inspiration from the Girvan-Newman
Algorithm [8].
The ChooseRoutes method splits G into disjoint routes that
can be locked for at least τmin blocks. Each route is constructed
by extracting a high weight channel, picking the direction which
requires smaller cltv_expiry_delta for forwarding payments,
and completing it to a circular route by repeatedly adding high
weight channels (where channels had equal weight, we preferred
ones with low cltv_expiry_delta). Only channels that keep the
route locked for at least τmin blocks are considered.
The CanExtendRoute method is used to check if an adjacent
channel is suitable for extending the route by checking if with it,
the route can still be locked for at least τmin blocks.
Algorithm 1 outputs RG — a partition of G’s channels into
disjoint routes that can be paralyzed for at least τmin blocks.
We apply Algorithm 1 separately to subgraphs with similar
max_concurrent_htlcs. We unify the outputs R = cupdottext
G
RG and
sort the set by routes weights in decreasing order as we want to
attack routes with higher weight first. Note that routes produced by
the algorithm are circular (from the attacker to itself) and require
the attacker to open two channels to begin and end each route.
For many channels in the network, the value set for
cltv_expiry_delta is different depending on the direction we
traverse the channel (this is because nodes may have set different
values for this parameter). Our greedy approach excelled at picking
directions with lower cltv_expiry_delta values naturally, which
allows it to form longer routes that paralyze more channels simul-
taneously. Other approaches that we explored, such as iterating
over a single channel back and forth to form a long path, resulted
in slightly worse performance.
4.1 Evaluation
We run the attack with τmin = 432, i.e. locking channels for at
least 3 days. We present the attack results, stopping after 1500
attacked routes. Each route requires the attacker to open exactly
two channels. We begin by attempting to lock a large amount
Function ChooseRoutes(G, τmin):
RG ← ∅ # disjoint routes list
CG ← E(G) channels
while CG , ∅ :
(nstar t ,nnext ) = CG .pop_max_weiдht()
if cltv_expiry_delta(nnext ) <
cltv_expiry_delta(nstar t ) :
swap(nnext ,nstar t )
route ← (nstar t ,nnext )
do
ncur = nnext
N = Neiдhbors(ncur ,CG )
L = {(ncur ,n)|n ∈
N ,CanExtendRoute(n, route,τmin )}
if L , ∅ :
(ncur ,nnext ) = L.pop_max_weiдht()
route ← nnext
CG .remove((ncur ,nnext ))
while L , ∅ and route .lenдth < 19
RG ← route
return RG
# checks if adding the node keeps the route locked
for at least τmin blocks
Function CanExtendRoute(n, route , τmin):
node_delta = cltv_expiry_delta(n)
route_timeout =
∑
ni ∈ route
cltv_expiry_delta(ni )
if node_delta ≤ 2016 − τmin − route_timeout :
return True
return False
Algorithm 1: Splits G into disjoint routes that can be locked for
at-least τmin blocks
of liquidity (setting the weight in Algorithm 1 to the channel’s
capacity).
Using our inferred node implementations from Section 3.3, we
partition the network into two sub-graphs:
(1) The network graph reduced to LND nodes. Which has
max_concurrent_htlcs defaults that are 483.
(2) The complementary graph, that consists of all channels
with at least one Eclair or C-Lightning node. These use a
default max_concurrent_htlcs of 30.
We visualize the results in Figure 6, presenting the fraction of
the network’s capacity that the attacker succeeds in locking as a
function of the resources it invests (the number of channels it is
required to open). We find for example that the attacker can lock
20% of the network’s capacity using only 78 channels, and can lock
90% using 954 channels.
In Figure 7, we run the attack changing the number of days that
channels remain locked for. The results indicate that the number of
attacker channels required to lock paths for different periods (from 1
to 6 days) differs only slightly. This can be explained by the relation
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Figure 6: Fraction of attacked network capacity
between the large locktime_max (2016 blocks) value, the small
cltv_expiry_deltas, and the 20-hop route length constraint. In
other words, most of the liquidity of the network can be attacked
using routes that consist of small cltv_expiry_deltas, allowing
the attacker to high timeouts and withhold the payments for a long
period.
Figure 7: Fraction of attacked network capacity for different
lock periods
We show more details on the results in Figure 8. The figure
shows that the attacker succeeds in attacking long routes (exploiting
maximum route length), and that most of the routes are locked for
more than the 3 days that were set as the minimal lock time.
Figure 9 explores how the attack would work on the Lightning
Network at different times. We use snapshots taken over several
months. The results generally show that the attack gets easier as
time passes. This can be explained by the changes made to default
parameters – increasing locktime_max to 2016 in all implementa-
tions and decreasing cltv_expiry_delta from 144 to 40 in LND.
Figure 8: Histogram of route lengths (including attacker’s
edges) and route lock times
Both changes make it easier to construct long routes with high
timeouts.
Figure 9: Fraction of attacked network capacity in different
snapshots
In figure 10, we showhow the attack affects connectivity between
nodes in the network. We used the same greedy algorithm as in 1,
only picking the channels by their betweenness centrality measure
(instead of capacity), removing channels with high betweenness
value first. We see that before the attack almost all pairs of nodes
(>99%) are connected. The rate in which nodes are disconnected
(no longer have any path between them) is presented in the graph.
Using only 30 attacker channels we disconnect 10% of the pairs in
the network, while with 630 channels we disconnect 50% of the
pairs. We stress that right now different Lightning implementations
try only a small handful of paths [36], so even a large fraction of
nodes that we noted as connected will not be able to route payments
between them.
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Figure 10: Fraction of connected pairs of nodes in the net-
work
Finally, we present an estimate of the attack’s costs. There are
two types of costs to consider:
(1) The cost of opening channels. The attacker pays the fee
required to place channel funding transactions on the
blockchain. We estimated the cost of opening a channel to
be 1 USD, which is typically higher than transaction fees
that we observed over the last 6 months [2].
(2) The cost of provisioning channels with liquidity. Attackers
must lock enough liquidity in their channels to later be
able to request enough payments over routes they seek to
paralyze. Locked funds are not spent, and will return to
the attacker once it completes the attack. The calculation
of the payment amounts takes into account the minimal
amounts nodes are willing to relay, and accounts for all
proportional and absolute fees these payments incur over
the entire route (using data from the actual network).
Figure 11 displays our evaluation of the costs. It clearly separates
the two types of costs mentioned above (non-refundable blockchain
fees and locked liquidity). Our results show that the attacker can
paralyze 700 BTC of liquidity in the Lightning Network for 3 days
using less than 0.25 BTC. We lock at-least 2000 satoshis in each
channel (we chose 2000 since we observed existing channels with
this capacity), but it is possible to also lock less [27]. The costs
we estimate above can be further lowered by opening multiple
channels with a single on-chain transaction. Once channels are
established, the attack may be repeated again and again with no
additional cost to the attacker.
5 ATTACKING HUBS - ATTACK ON A SINGLE
NODE
In this section we consider an attack aimed at disconnecting a single
node from the network for an extended period of time. Here, the
adversary connects to the victim node and paralyzes its adjacent
channels one by one using the following steps:
Figure 11: Cost of the Attack
(1) the adversary connects to the victim with a new channel.
(2) it then initiates a payment to itself via a route that begins
with its connection to the victim, and then traverses a
single target channel back and forth multiple times, then
the path returns to the attacker. It is important to note,
that such paths that traverse channels back and forth are
possible (see section 6).
(3) The attacker makes multiple payment requests over this
path until the target channel reaches max_concurrent-
_htlcs. Note that in this case, the attacker’s own channel
is usually not maxed out, and can be used to attack another
target channel.
Figure 12 depicts the attack. We note that the attack is still possi-
ble to carry out if the victim does not accept direct connections (but
at a somewhat lower efficiency). In this case, we would connect to
neighbors of the victim.
waits
hub
Figure 12: Attack on Hub
Once the target channel is paralyzed, we move to the next one
and apply the same method. We will need to open a new channel
between the adversary and the target node every time that the
former reaches its max_concurrent_htlcs. Yet, at each payment
we withhold only two HTLC s on the adversary’s channel while it is
possible to reach up to 18 HTLC s in the target channel at the same
time. In other words, in order to attack all of the victim’s channels,
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the adversary needs to open a small number of channels relative to
the victim’s degree.
5.1 Evaluation
We evaluate the attack on prominent nodes in the network. Table 3
summarizes our results. The names of nodes were taken from our
snapshot data directly. The last entry in the table relates to an attack
on LNBIG that isolates all 25 nodes from the rest of the network,
without paralyzing links between the nodes themselves. Paths were
set so that all links are paralyzed for at least 3 days in each iteration.
Alias % of Network Node’s Attacker
Liquidity Degree Channels
ACINQ 8% 557 106
OpenNode 5.6% 549 75
Bitfinex 4.9% 321 29
Bitrefill 3.4% 312 39
LNBIG [lnd-01] 2.9% 408 44
LNBIG (25 nodes) 43.3% 5179 472
Table 3: Attack on Selected Nodes
We evaluated the cost of attack on all nodes in the network
using a snapshot from May 21st, 2020, isolating each node for 3
days. Figure 13 presents a histogram of the degree of nodes and
shows the relation between the degree and the number of channels
attackers needed to perform the attack on each node. Each node is
represented by a point in the graph. The number of channels is not
directly determined by the degree, because different nodes have set
up different values of cltv_expiry_delta.
We see that most nodes have a very low degree and are extremely
easy to isolate. Even nodes with high degree, require far fewer
channels than the degree to attack.
Figure 13: Degree Analysis
In an additional evaluation, we estimate the cost of isolating
nodes running one of the major implementations, assuming default
values are used by it and its neighbors. As before, we find the
number of channels the attacker needs to open in order to isolate
a node for 3 days for different degrees. We present the results in
Figure 14. Notice that implementations differ due to their different
default values. We recall from Section 3.3 that ∼ 90% of nodes run
LND. Figure 14 shows that these are the easiest to attack.
Eclair is hardest to attack due to its higher default cltv_expiry-
_delta value. LND’s value of cltv_expiry_delta is higher than
C-Lightning (40 vs 14), but it is still easier to attack due to its
different locktime_max value (CLTV values were low enough so
that they did not form a constraint—the number of hops was the
main restriction on path length).
Figure 14: Implementation analysis - number of channels
required in order to isolate nodes of different degrees
6 PROOF OF CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION
To demonstrate the viability of the attack we proposed, we con-
ducted several experiments using C-Lightning nodes that were run-
ning over a separate Bitcoin network (in regtest mode). We detail
the main experiments conducted—additional ones appear in code.
The source code of our implementation including all experiments
is available at github6.
We begin with an experiment that shows that we can maintain
a single HTLC “live” for an extended period, and that we can then
revert the state without having any of our channels closed.
Experiment 1 (Maintaining a Single HTLC). We set up a simple
network Attacker1 ↔ Alice ↔ Bob ↔ Attacker2. Then Attacker1
initiates a single payment to Attacker2. Attacker2 does not respond
with the HTLC secret immediately, but instead waits. We consider two
different waiting periods:
(1) Waiting past the HTLC timeout. In this case Bob closes the
channel with Attacker2.
(2) Waiting one block before the HTLC timeout, and sending an
update_fail_htlc message. In this case the payment is
canceled, the corresponding HTLCs along the entire path fail,
but all channels remain open.
6https://github.com/ayeletmz/Lightning-Network-Congestion-Attacks
9
The following experiment that we conducted demonstrates our
ability to block payments over a channel between victims Alice and
Bob.
Experiment 2 (Blocking the Victim’s Channel). We repeat
the setup of Experiment1: Attacker1↔ Alice↔ Bob↔ Attacker2.
We create 483 different payments from Attacker1 to Attacker2. Again,
Attacker2 does not instantly respond with the secret.
We now try to establish one more additional payment from Alice
to Bob. The payment fails. Just before HTLC expiration, Attacker2
responds with update_fail_htlc messages for all payments and
now, an additional payment does succeed.
The above experiment also blocks the payment from Alice
to Bob if some of the 483 payments are in the reverse di-
rection (from Attacker2 to Attacker1), demonstrating that the
max_concurrent_htlcs limit applies to HTLCs in either direction.
We additionally tried the experiment above in paths that con-
tained loops (even including back and forth traversals of a single
channel). These are all allowed by nodes. We used this in a proof
of concept experiment to attack a single hub.
Experiment 3 (Back and forth attack on a single hub). We
set up the network Attacker1↔ Hub↔ Node↔ Attacker2. Attacker1
initiates payments to itself in the following route, and does not respond
with the secrets:
(1) Attacker1→ Hub.
(2) 9 times back and forth on Hub↔ Node.
(3) Hub→ Attacker1.
After 26 such payments, Hub↔ Node holds 26 · 18 = 468 unresolved
payments. Sending an additional payment will fail (27 · 18 = 486 >
483). Hence, Attacker1 sends 2 additional payments that are meant to
fill up the remaining HTLC quota:
• Similarly to the previous paths, only going back and forth 7
times on the channel connecting Hub↔ Node
• Finally, a single payment to Attacker2: Attacker1→ Hub→
Node→ Attacker2
We now try to establish a payment from Hub to Node, which
fails, confirming that we did paralyze this channel. A payment from
Attacker1 to Hub succeeds. In fact, Attacker1 succeeds sending 428
(483− 27 · 2− 1) more payments to Hub while Hub↔ Node is blocked.
These “free” 428 payments may be used to attack other channels
connected to this Hub.
In the next experiment we tried paths with varying
max_concurrent_htlcs values, and verified that the mini-
mal value constrains such paths. We further checked that only the
edge with the minimal value is fully locked.
Experiment 4 (Varying max_concurrent_htlcs). We set up the
network Attacker1↔ Alice↔ Bob↔ Carol↔ Attacker2. Attacker2
does not respond with the HTLC secrets. Attacker1, Alice, Carol and
Attacker2 have max_concurrent_htlcs configured as 483, while Bob
configured max_concurrent_htlcs to be 30. We create 30 different
payments from Attacker1 to Attacker2. An additional payment from
Attacker1 to Attacker2 fails. An additional payment including Bob
in the route, fails. An additional payment from Attacker1 to Alice,
or from Attacker2 to Carol succeeds. 453 additional payments from
Carol to Attacker2 are accepted and wait for Attacker2 to respond.
In the additional experiments, we also verified that paths are
indeed limited to 20 hops and to 2016 block lock-time in total
(aggregated over the entire path).
7 SOLUTIONS
In this section we discuss several proposed adjustments to payment
channel network protocols that may help mitigate the attack. Specif-
ically, we discuss some ideas that were raised in the Lightning-dev
mailing list [7, 32], as well as our own suggestions. We discuss
weaknesses and strengths of each such suggestion.
Enforcing fast HTLC resolution. This is our most drastic sugges-
tion (and perhaps the most controversial one): While HTLC expira-
tion times allow nodes to remain secure and provide sufficient time
to publish transactions to the network, we propose the addition of
another timeout mechanism. Specifically, if HTLC secrets are not
propagated fast enough from one’s neighbor the channel with this
neighbor should be closed.
Each node should announce to its successor in the path its own
deadline for resolving the HTLC. The node would then be able to
communicate an earlier deadline for HTLC resolution to its next hop.
If the timeout arrives, and the HTLC was not fulfilled or canceled,
the node will wait for the HTLC to naturally expire, but will close
the channel with its neighbor.
To avoid having all channels along the path closed due to a
failure to complete the HTLC in time, and specifically to avoid closing
channels between compliant nodes, the last node in the path will
provide proof of the channel closure to its predecessors (this can
be done using a zero-knowledge proof for example).
We stress that this proposed mechanism does not replace the
HTLC timeouts that still ensure the safety with regards to the current
payment. Our mechanism is a way to disconnect misbehaving peers
from the network in order to prevent them from repeating the attack
many times at no cost.
We note that it is risky to add behavior that automatically closes
channels, and so this proposal warrants further evaluation. We
leave this to future work.
Reducing route length. We suggest lowering the maximum al-
lowed route length (currently 20 hops). The network graph is a
small world network [31] – it is highly connected, and a smaller
number of hops should still suffice. We point out that shortest
paths between nodes in the network have an average of less than
3 hops and that the network diameter is ∼ 6 [31, 33], which are
significantly lower than the 20 allowed hops. In Figure 15, we show
the fraction of successfully attacked capacity (with respect to the
attack described in Section 4), assuming that different max route
lengths are allowed. The figure shows that attackers need many
more channels to attack if they are forced to use shorter route
lengths.
Setting number of max concurrent payments based on trust level.
Currently, each node configures max_concurrent_htlcs to bound
the maximum transfers it is willing to hold concurrently. Most of
the nodes use the default value configured by the implementation
they run, and in all cases this value may not exceed the number
483 which is derived from the blockchain’s limitations. We suggest
changing the way nodes configure this parameter, adjusting the
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Figure 15: Fraction of capacity attacked for different max
route lengths
value according to the level of trust they have in particular peers.
Setting a high max_concurrent_htlcs for some peer effectively
allows it to route many concurrent payments through your node
and to do more damage if it is malicious. Therefore, newly created
channels with unknown and untrusted nodes should default to a
low max_concurrent_htlcs.
Loop Avoidance. As our experiments show, it is possible to con-
struct paths that visit the same node several times, including tra-
versals of the same channel back and forth. It is relatively simple
for nodes to disallow such paths. Since HTLCs that belong to the
same path use the same hash, they can be easily recognized and
rejected. This will make some of our attacks harder to carry out,
and will not hurt the usability of the payment network.
Non-refundable fees for HTLC setup. For the sake of completeness,
we mention an idea that was discussed in [7, 13]. Pre-paying a non-
refundable fee for route establishment was suggested as a way to
mitigate the attack. The idea was to raise costs for the attacker,
forcing it to pay fees even if payments are not eventually routed
along the path. There are several reasons to avoid this proposal.
The first relates to the effectiveness—it does not prevent the attack.
As we have seen in the evaluation of our attack cost (Figure 11),
even if the attacker pays the fees, the cost will remain low. Secondly,
forcing fee payment in cases of failure will cause other problems:
one can intentionally fail to complete HTLC setup causing senders
to lose fees. Strategic attackers may collect fees from setup and at
the same time fail to relay the payment. Lastly, non-refundable fees
will also alter the way honest nodes route – they will be less willing
to attempt to route via paths that are likely to fail.
8 RELATEDWORK
The structural properties of the Lightning Network and its topology
have been studied in [33]. The work goes on to study the robustness
of the network to targeted attacks as well as to random node failures,
applying techniques that are often used to assess the resilience of
scale-free networks such as the internet. A similar study of the
network’s robustness appears in [14].
A DDoS attack on the Lightning Network occurred in March
of 2018. Many nodes were flooded with traffic and Around 200
Lightning nodes were taken offline [37]. Several studies explore
more sophisticated attacks on the Lightning Network. Some focus
on privacy issues, and others on isolating nodes or disrupting the
network in other ways. In [31], an attack that disrupts the liquidity
balance of channels is explored. The attacker initiates payments
that move all the liquidity to one side, effectively blocking payments
in that direction (payments in the other direction are still possible).
Using this technique, they explore node isolation (all liquidity is
pushed away from the victim on all links but the attacker’s links).
Our attack differs from the attack in [31], as they require direct
connections to the victim node, as well as locked liquidity in high
amounts (up to the liquidity the victim has), and also require the
payment of fees for large transactions.
A similar attack uses payment griefing but avoids paying the fees
[26]. In this variant of the attack, the attacker still sends a payment
in one direction that unbalances the channel in order to isolate a
node. This time it withholds the HTLC pre-image in order to lock the
amount, and never really executes the payment. Unlike our attack,
this attack still requires large amounts of locked funds, but does
indeed avoid paying most of the fees (channel establishment is still
needed).
[36] presents a denial-of-service attack based on route hijacking
within the Lightning Network. Exploring how routes are created by
the most common Lightning implementations, they find that attack-
ing few nodes can result with a denial-of-service to a large fraction
of the network. They show how connecting with few channels to
the network offering low fees draws most of the routes which yields
a potent attack. Our work does not rely on the routing strategy of
nodes to attack the network.
[19] explores a clever attack that allows the “short-cutting” of
long payment channels on which the attacker appears twice. This
allows the attacker to steal the fees of intermediate nodes. The
payment is carried out, but nodes in between the two attacker
nodes are tricked into thinking the payment was not executed.
The privacy of payments in the Lightning Network is known to
be relatively weak. Discovering the current liquidity balance of a
channel can be accomplished using techniques from [12]. The main
idea is to try different payment sizes over a channel. Learning the
response yields lower and upper bounds on the available liquidity.
Due to the above-mentioned privacy reasons and other practical
concerns, channels along the network do not reveal their balance,
causing a significant decrease in transaction success rates. [35]
explores this tradeoff between privacy and utility in PCNs, consid-
ering adding noise to channels as well (which adds privacy, but
lowers efficiency).
As we have seen, in the Lightning Network each intermediate
node along a payment route adds a delay (cltv_expiry_delta)
to the total cltv expiry of the path. This leads to high lock-times
which contributes to our attack. Sprites, a new type of payment
channels, are introduced in [22]. They reduce the time a path can
be locked due to a pending payment. Sprites are implemented in
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the Raiden network on the Ethereum blockchain [25], where a
“Preimage Manager” smart contract resolves disputes in parallel.
This sort of technique is not applicable to the Bitcoin blockchain,
due to its more limited scripting language.
In [9, 11, 17] several protocols improving upon privacy issues in
off-chain payment channels are suggested. While [9, 11] support
only single-hop payments, the proposal in [17] fits linked payment
channels (but provides weaker privacy guarantees).
Other advances in payment channel networks appear in [1, 20],
which discuss delegating dispute handling to third party services
(called watchtowers) that continuously monitor the blockchain on
behalf of others checking if channels closures that should be “ap-
pealed” were sent to the blockchain. The watchtower then appeals
on behalf of the users and redeems funds. This allows users to be
less available and still remain safe.
[21] presents a technical overview of BitcoinâĂŹs payment chan-
nel networks. In [18] they construct multi-hop locks for secure and
privacy preserving PCNs. Additional work on off-chain protocols
can be found in a wider survey [10].
9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper we discussed a fundamental vulnerability that arises in
payment channel networks as part of the construction of trust-less
multi-hop payments. We presented three types of attacks: the first
aims to lock as many high liquidity channels as possible for an
extended period, the second disconnects as many pairs of nodes
as possible in the network, and the third isolates hubs from the
rest of the network. We evaluated these attacks over the Lightning
Network. We examined the network’s properties and different pa-
rameters set by the three main implementations of the Lightning
Network. We showed how recent changes in default parameters
agreed upon by Lightning Devs have made the attack easier to
carry out. Our results show that it is possible to disrupt the Light-
ning Network by locking most of its liquidity using less than half a
bitcoin.
Further work must be conducted in order to mitigate this type of
attack. We have suggested several solutions to reduce the success
rate of these attacks, but such mitigation is generally harder due to
the nature of the attack: it relies on several fundamental properties
of payment channel networks, and the blockchain.
Another way in which this work can be extended, is to eval-
uate the effect of max_concurrent_htlcs on naturally occurring
network congestion. The limit on concurrent HTLCs sets a limit
on the rate of payments the network can handle. This will require
measuring typical response times of nodes to an HTLC secret, and
to failure messages.
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